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FOREWORD: THE RISE OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 
MAURICE E. STUCKE* 
Many of you likely encountered law and economics in law school—perhaps in a 
law and economics seminar or in a particular class, such as discussing efficient breach 
in your contracts course.  Some of you, however, had difficulty identifying with Homo 
Economicus—namely, the rational, self-interested profit-maximizer who acts with great 
willpower. 
The economics literature over the past thirty years has moved beyond 
neoclassical economic theory’s assumptions of perfectly rational market participants 
who pursue, with willpower, their economic self-interest.  These assumptions came 
under attack from several interdisciplinary economic fields, most notably behavioral 
economics.  Behavioral economics attempts to integrate psychologists’ 
understanding of human behavior into economic analysis.  Over the past thirty years, 
the economic literature increasingly recognized and measured when and how (i) 
willpower is imperfect, (ii) people will incur costs to punish unfair behavior and care 
about the fair treatment of others, and (iii) biases and heuristics affect decision-
making. 
Behavioral economics, the management consulting firm McKinsey & Company 
recently observed, “is now mainstream.”1  Best-selling books feature behavioral 
                                               
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow, American Antitrust 
Institute.  
1 Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, MCKINSEY Q., Spring 2010, at 30.  
310  TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 13 
 
economics,2 which is now a staple in graduate economics programs, business 
schools, and, increasingly, law schools.  
Behavioral economics, while popular before the economic crisis, is especially 
relevant today.  The economic crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak 
regulation, moral hazard, and our lack of understanding about how many markets 
actually operate.  In 2011, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) noted how “the worst financial and economic crisis in our 
lifetime”3 has prompted policymakers to ask: “Are our economic theories, our 
economic models, and our assumptions still appropriate?”4  The Obama 
administration is considering the implications of behavioral economics in the areas 
of health, finance, media, and law.  The United Kingdom, among other countries, is 
also turning to behavioral economics.5 
Students at the University of Tennessee College of Law are also considering the 
policy implications of behavioral economics, once one relaxes the assumptions of 
rationality, willpower, and self-interest.  How can the government incorporate 
behavioral economics to model the impact of policy interventions?  What is the role 
of government if individuals make mistakes or have self-control problems that make 
them act against their own well-being?  What are the policy implications of 
behavioral economics in the courtroom?  What are the policy implications if firms 
suffer biases and heuristics or if the government is relatively more or less rational 
than market participants?  What does behavioral economics add to (or take away 
from) the policymaker’s toolkit?  
Students in the behavioral law and economics seminar consider two overarching 
concerns.  The first is creeping authoritarianism.  To protect its citizens, the 
government places greater restrictions on the citizens’ ability to manage their affairs.  
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A bureaucracy that exists to protect its bounded rational citizens does not have much 
incentive to improve the citizens’ bounded rationality and willpower.  The 
bureaucrats’ livelihood, authority, and status depend on citizens remaining 
sufficiently irrational to justify the bureaucracy’s existence.  Consumers are 
encouraged to register their complaints with the government, which intercedes on 
their behalf.  The consumer complaints justify additional regulations to deter 
behavioral exploitation.  Inevitably, the heavily regulated firms become de facto state 
enterprises.  Under this worst-case scenario, economic competition and liberty cease 
to be concerns.  
The second concern develops if the government takes a laissez-faire approach.  
Here the government renounces any intention to regulate the market, and a similar 
anti-democratic outcome arises.  Economically powerful firms lobby the government 
to refrain from regulating the marketplace.  While economically exploiting bounded 
rational consumers, firms advocate the virtues of consumer sovereignty under a 
laissez-faire approach.  Under this ideology, markets are presumably efficient (or 
heading toward greater efficiency).  The government fails to address market failures 
(or when it does act, it uses ineffective means to address the problem).   
Thus our behavioral law and economics seminar navigates the risks of 
behavioral exploitation, ineffective governmental policies, and the risks of sacrificing 
economic freedom to an increasingly authoritarian government.  Not surprisingly, 
our discussions resulted in several interesting paper topics.  In addition to Grant 
Marshall's and Tyler Morgan's articles, the behavioral law and economics seminar 
produced other interesting research: 
• Olatayo Atanda looked at antitrust’s predatory pricing standard through a 
behavioral economics lens; 
• Caleb Barron examined how policymakers can use behavioral economics to 
reduce income inequality in the United States;  
• Nathaniel Dallas looked at how behavioral economics can better explain why 
people choose to participate in crowdfunding; 
• Matthew Delinko examined what the recent Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act does (and does not do) to combat smokers’ optimism 
bias while Thomas Gossett explored how raising the cigarette taxes will 
affect smoking; 
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• Stephanie Epperson explored the relationship between economic freedom 
and happiness; 
• Henry Hildebrand considered the role of overconfidence bias in the student 
loan default rate at for-profit universities;  
• Jessica Jackson examined whether social norms were more effective than 
financial incentives to tackle obesity; 
• Brent Laman considered whether jurors were more likely to believe, and give 
greater weight to, the testimony of physically attractive expert witnesses; 
• Trevor McElhaney and Fred Pickney took a behavioral economics approach 
to payday lending; 
• Merrill F. Nelson, II considered the existence of Veblen effects in the Vidalia 
onion industry;  
• Michael Stahl considered the implications of behavioral economics on 
program trading;  
• Greg Talley explored the limitations of neoclassical economic theory in 
explaining racial discrimination and how behavioral economics could 
illuminate the discussion; and  
• Alex Warner examined the infrequency of gym use and per-use gym 
memberships and whether gyms were intentionally exploiting consumers’ 
bounded rationality and willpower. 
The TRANSACTIONS editors selected for this Symposium two papers from my fall 
2011 behavioral law and economics seminar and a third paper from the law and 
economics seminar of my colleague, Professor Robert Lloyd.  
 N. Adam Dietrich, as part of Professor Lloyd’s seminar, examines regulatory 
capture in his article, BP’s Deepwater Horizon: “The Goldman Sachs of the Sea,” and how 
the oil and gas industry effectively captured the federal agency charged with 
regulating offshore drilling in the outer continental shelf.  Using the recent BP oil 
spill, Adam explores the factors that contribute to regulatory capture and the extent 
to which the BP oil spill is the result of the failures of big government.  One 
important factor, Adam points out, that made the federal agency susceptible to 
industry influence, and ultimately a victim of regulatory capture, was the gradual 
degeneration of the agency’s ethical culture. 
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 Grant Marshall, in his article, Hold the Mayo: Why Strong Deference to Treasury 
Regulations Might Not Be Healthy, raises an interesting issue, namely whether behavioral 
economics applies to governmental agencies.  If firms and individuals suffer from 
biases and heuristics, can governmental regulations also reflect (perhaps to different 
degrees) these biases and heuristics?  If so, to what extent should courts defer to the 
agencies’ expertise?  Moreover, Grant explores how administrative law (and the 
degree of judicial deference) can be used to debias agency decision-making. 
 Tyler Morgan, in his article, The Refinancing Crisis in Commercial Real Estate:  
Dodd-Frank Threatens to Curtail CMBS Lending, takes a behavioral economics 
perspective on the subprime home mortgage crisis.  He then examines whether these 
concerns translate to the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) market.  
Tyler argues that the policy concerns behind the risk retention and mandatory 
disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act do not exist in the CMBS market.  Whereas behavioral economics 
plays a role in one industry, Tyler discusses, it does not necessarily affect other 
related industries.  
 The aim of the behavioral law and economics seminar and of this symposium 
is not to hail behavioral economics as the elixir for today’s prevailing policy issues.  
Instead the aim is to provide a glimpse of some of the current issues that our law 
students are tackling in re-examining basic behavioral assumptions. 
